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Behavior is the core concept both in legal and economic research. For law, 
behavior is a legal fact which can cause corresponding legal judgment. As 
behavioral norms, the central function of law is to guide and shape human 
behavior. And the reason why behavioral standards are needed is that there is a 
need to coordinate actions between individuals to facilitate cooperation， 
maintain the basic social order and promote social development. That law 
depends on the behavior is just like lever depends on the fulcrum. If legal lever 
does not find the fulcrum, then it will be a mere formality, and if depends on the 
wrong fulcrum, then it will be less effective. Similarly, economics is mainly 
about how people behave when facing choices and guiding the behavior through 
the internalizing mechanism. In the context of economics, the main function of 
law acts as an incentive mechanism, and the core of legislation is about the 
design of this incentive mechanisms. And the duality characteristic of 
externality and internalization implies the symmetry of legal mechanism design. 
Based on probing the behavior pedigree and differentiating the merits between 
punishment and reward, this text try to clarify the actual impact of legal rules 
on people's behavior precisely through modeling legal mechanisms and 
individual behavior, and get the conclusion: the optimal legal system should not 
only give potential offenders the right incentives to behave in accordance with 
the best social behavior model; but also give right incentives to the potential 
benefactor to comply with the best behavior model so as to patronizing other 
people and society. Such understanding about the symmetrical character of 
legal mechanism design is no doubt useful to legal police making. 
 
































































S Supply Curve 
D Demand Curve 
P Price 
Q quantity 
MPC Marginal Private Cost 
MSC Marginal Social Cost 
MPB Marginal Private Benefit 
MSB Marginal Social Benefit 
MEC Marginal External Cost 
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